Naval battles revisited<br />
<br />
By Commander (retd) Muhammad Azam Khan<br />
<br />
No star would I be, if it lay in my will, <br />
But a gleaming white pearl in the cavernous sea, --<br />
Lives that need have no acquaintance with death:<br />
Can that be called life, which hears death's importunity? <br />
If, making earth lovely, our end must be thus, <br />
Let me rather be changed to a flower-falling dew drop <br />
Iqbal (Bang-i-Dara) <br />
<br />
It is a fact that countless acts of gallantry, indomitable courage and sacrifices of our officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen during the 1971 war could not stop the inevitable from happening. Some heroic events of the naval battle in which a relatively small and much neglected Pakistan Navy put up a resolute fight against a far bigger Indian Navy find scant mention in chronicles. This is so since history, more often than not, is documented by the triumphant. Thus there is no shortage of war accounts most of which have been rendered by Indian authors in a rather blown out fashion.<br />
<br />
In his recently published memoir, which is a crude attempt at personal glorification, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, Admiral S.M Nanda catalogues some lofty actions of Indian Navy during the 1971 war. But only two events prove that had Pakistan made some rightful investments in its navy and certain crucially needed decisions come in time, the history of war, at least in the naval context, may have been different.<br />
<br />
Pakistan Navy submarine, PNS Hangor under the Command of the then Commander (later Vice-Admiral) Ahmad Tasnim, SJ sailed on Nov 22, 1971, for war deployment. On the night of 2-3rd Dec, while lying in wait off Bombay, Hangor detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy Western fleet that included cruiser INS Mysore. Sensing impending war in the west, Indian armada was sailing out of Bombay harbour, and passed incredibly close to Hangor. Since the commanding officer of PN submarine did not have the clearance, a valuable opportunity to destroy some prize enemy units was lost just hours before the onset of war. Within Hangor, frustration at missing the prey by such a narrow margin was too great and as Admiral Nanda states in his memoirs, years later when he met Admiral Tasnim, the latter told him that while Indian fleet passed almost overhead, "he was egged by many hotheads (sic) in the control room to fire his torpedoes which he refused on the grounds that war had not broken out".<br />
<br />
When PNS Hangor proceeded for war patrol in November 1971, outbreak of war in the west was a foregone conclusion. Even at the peril of starting the war, had permission to the Pakistan Navy been accorded and a large Indian Navy combatant like cruiser INS Mysore sunk in the opening moments of war, the entire Indian western fleet (fearing PN submarines) may have remained repressed inside the harbour. In the event Pakistan could have avoided several missile attacks that I.N subsequently carried out on Karachi. It was not until the morning of December 4 that Hangor learned about the outbreak of hostilities. The much-needed information that could have tilted the tables in favour of the Pakistan Navy thus came a little too late. Indeed, what is lost in a moment is lost for eternity.<br />
<br />
In order to avoid compromising its position and thus losing surprise when deployed, submarines always avoid transmitting messages. This becomes critically important during wartime where a minor lapse can cost heavily. Nonetheless, Hangor made a daring departure from the established policy and sought shift in the assigned patrol area to a position where the command believed the submarine had better chances to get enemy ships. The bold deviation eventually paid off but not before Hangor was picked up the Indian Navy via communication intercept. The Pakistani submarine was positioned by the Indians west of Diu (on India's Kathiawar coast, 330miles south west of Karachi). Two Indian Navy ships, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan, were dispatched to hunt down Hangor.<br />
<br />
In the early hours of Dec 9, PNS Hangor spotted the two Indian ships patrolling alongside each other. PN submarine positioned itself in-between and fired the first torpedo that missed INS Kirpan. The second torpedo, however, hit INS Khukri right under the ship's aft explosive magazine. The massive combined effect of torpedo and explosion in the magazine sank enemy ship so rapidly that 18 officers and 176 sailors had no time to abandon. Mission accomplished; Hangor now had the formidable task of evading enemy onslaught.<br />
<br />
What followed during the next 72 hours or so, (though cannot be described in detail due to space constraints) is naval history rewritten by PNS Hangor's crew. It is a tale of heroism, glory and valour etched in the memories of scores of men of the Pakistan Navy. Following sinking of INS Khukri, the Indian Navy assembled every available asset at its disposal in order to chase and destroy PN submarine. PNS Hangor was ceaselessly and aggressively attacked using all kinds of platforms ranging from destroyers, frigates to reconnaissance aircraft. Nearly 156 explosive depth charges were dropped by the Indian Navy to destroy PN submarine. Luck, however, was on the side of Hangor. Thus much against odds, PN submarine managed to elude Indian Navy blitz.<br />
<br />
The sinking of INS Khukri was a devastating blow to the Indian Navy's high spirits generated by the earlier exaggerated success stories of missile attacks on Karachi. Not only did the Indian Navy call off a planned missile attack on Karachi due on the 10th of Dec, but no further attacks were conducted for the remaining duration of the war.<br />
<br />
The action of Hangor and the ensuing hunt shall remain an unrivalled event recorded in the annals of naval history. The story shall also serve to remind the future Indian naval generations of the hollowness of the then large Indian Navy anti-submarine force. Here, it is also worth mentioning that despite having preponderance and a huge fleet of Soviet submarines, I.N could neither effectively deploy nor achieve a single strike against the Pakistan Navy through these offensive platforms. To this day, however, unpersuasive attempts continue to be made by the Indians in justifying the blemished role of their submarine fleet in 1971.<br />
<br />
The story of PN submarine Ghazi, though tragic, is no less death defying. It is an epic account of guts written in blood by the crew members. In 1971, PNS Ghazi was the Pakistan Navy's only submarine which had the reach to undertake operations on India's Eastern sea board in the Bay of Bengal. Dispatch of PNS Ghazi (commanded by Commander Zafar Mahmood, Shaheed) was not part of the original plan. The submarine was sent under intense pressure from the Pakistan Army's Eastern command which desired some action by PN to thin out Indian pressure on land. Oddly, this was much against the long stated belief of the Pakistan Army that "defence of East lies in the West" to which PN had previously suffered with at least one naval chief stepping down after Field Marshal Ayub refused his request for maintaining a strong navy to defend both wings.<br />
<br />
In any case, the long and arduous journey of nearly 2,250miles along the enemy's coast, the overwhelming task to lay the newly-acquired mines (launched from submarine torpedo tubes) and the singular effort to track down Indian Carrier against the imposing strength of Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet were just not enough to deter the command and crew of PNS Ghazi in undertaking a mission which by all accounts they knew was only one-way journey.<br />
<br />
Fearing PNS Ghazi, the Indian Navy moved its carrier force (INS Vikrant) further eastward to Andaman Island; much away from the scene of action. For Vice-Admiral N. Krishnan, Flag officer Commanding Indian Navy Eastern Command, PNS Ghazi was no less than a nightmare. In his account, the Indian flag officer acknowledges that each morning he prayed for divine help and protection from Kali Devi (PNS Ghazi). His prayers were indeed answered; Ghazi sank on the night of 3rd-4th Dec after an explosion occurred onboard while the submarine operated off Visakhapatnam. Since all 82 crew members embraced Shahadat it is unlikely that the mystery surrounding circumstances in which Ghazi met her end will ever be unveiled. Still, the Indian claims of sinking Ghazi are not only false but utterly absurd, to say the least.<br />
<br />
It requires no extraordinary interpolation that had PNS Ghazi survived, the possibility of Indian carrier operating in the Bay of Bengal let alone deploy its fighters to augment IAF efforts (as it did following confirmation of sinking of PNS Ghazi) or the symbolic nay bogus naval landing by the Indian Navy carried out on the shores of erstwhile East Pakistan towards the closing stages of the war would have remained only a pipedream. Alas! Things were not in our favour in 1971.<br />
<br />
Though Ghazi's heroic effort could not prevent the war finale, it shall remain an icon of unparalleled gallantry and a shinning beacon of sacrifice in the defence of its motherland. Sadly, while the Hangor crew was aptly rewarded for the daring deed, the valiant effort of PNS Ghazi remains unsung to this day. An award even 35 years later may not be too late but rather serve as a fitting epitaph for the resting souls in the Bay of Bengal.
<br />
By Commander (retd) Muhammad Azam Khan<br />
<br />
No star would I be, if it lay in my will, <br />
But a gleaming white pearl in the cavernous sea, --<br />
Lives that need have no acquaintance with death:<br />
Can that be called life, which hears death's importunity? <br />
If, making earth lovely, our end must be thus, <br />
Let me rather be changed to a flower-falling dew drop <br />
Iqbal (Bang-i-Dara) <br />
<br />
It is a fact that countless acts of gallantry, indomitable courage and sacrifices of our officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen during the 1971 war could not stop the inevitable from happening. Some heroic events of the naval battle in which a relatively small and much neglected Pakistan Navy put up a resolute fight against a far bigger Indian Navy find scant mention in chronicles. This is so since history, more often than not, is documented by the triumphant. Thus there is no shortage of war accounts most of which have been rendered by Indian authors in a rather blown out fashion.<br />
<br />
In his recently published memoir, which is a crude attempt at personal glorification, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, Admiral S.M Nanda catalogues some lofty actions of Indian Navy during the 1971 war. But only two events prove that had Pakistan made some rightful investments in its navy and certain crucially needed decisions come in time, the history of war, at least in the naval context, may have been different.<br />
<br />
Pakistan Navy submarine, PNS Hangor under the Command of the then Commander (later Vice-Admiral) Ahmad Tasnim, SJ sailed on Nov 22, 1971, for war deployment. On the night of 2-3rd Dec, while lying in wait off Bombay, Hangor detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy Western fleet that included cruiser INS Mysore. Sensing impending war in the west, Indian armada was sailing out of Bombay harbour, and passed incredibly close to Hangor. Since the commanding officer of PN submarine did not have the clearance, a valuable opportunity to destroy some prize enemy units was lost just hours before the onset of war. Within Hangor, frustration at missing the prey by such a narrow margin was too great and as Admiral Nanda states in his memoirs, years later when he met Admiral Tasnim, the latter told him that while Indian fleet passed almost overhead, "he was egged by many hotheads (sic) in the control room to fire his torpedoes which he refused on the grounds that war had not broken out".<br />
<br />
When PNS Hangor proceeded for war patrol in November 1971, outbreak of war in the west was a foregone conclusion. Even at the peril of starting the war, had permission to the Pakistan Navy been accorded and a large Indian Navy combatant like cruiser INS Mysore sunk in the opening moments of war, the entire Indian western fleet (fearing PN submarines) may have remained repressed inside the harbour. In the event Pakistan could have avoided several missile attacks that I.N subsequently carried out on Karachi. It was not until the morning of December 4 that Hangor learned about the outbreak of hostilities. The much-needed information that could have tilted the tables in favour of the Pakistan Navy thus came a little too late. Indeed, what is lost in a moment is lost for eternity.<br />
<br />
In order to avoid compromising its position and thus losing surprise when deployed, submarines always avoid transmitting messages. This becomes critically important during wartime where a minor lapse can cost heavily. Nonetheless, Hangor made a daring departure from the established policy and sought shift in the assigned patrol area to a position where the command believed the submarine had better chances to get enemy ships. The bold deviation eventually paid off but not before Hangor was picked up the Indian Navy via communication intercept. The Pakistani submarine was positioned by the Indians west of Diu (on India's Kathiawar coast, 330miles south west of Karachi). Two Indian Navy ships, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan, were dispatched to hunt down Hangor.<br />
<br />
In the early hours of Dec 9, PNS Hangor spotted the two Indian ships patrolling alongside each other. PN submarine positioned itself in-between and fired the first torpedo that missed INS Kirpan. The second torpedo, however, hit INS Khukri right under the ship's aft explosive magazine. The massive combined effect of torpedo and explosion in the magazine sank enemy ship so rapidly that 18 officers and 176 sailors had no time to abandon. Mission accomplished; Hangor now had the formidable task of evading enemy onslaught.<br />
<br />
What followed during the next 72 hours or so, (though cannot be described in detail due to space constraints) is naval history rewritten by PNS Hangor's crew. It is a tale of heroism, glory and valour etched in the memories of scores of men of the Pakistan Navy. Following sinking of INS Khukri, the Indian Navy assembled every available asset at its disposal in order to chase and destroy PN submarine. PNS Hangor was ceaselessly and aggressively attacked using all kinds of platforms ranging from destroyers, frigates to reconnaissance aircraft. Nearly 156 explosive depth charges were dropped by the Indian Navy to destroy PN submarine. Luck, however, was on the side of Hangor. Thus much against odds, PN submarine managed to elude Indian Navy blitz.<br />
<br />
The sinking of INS Khukri was a devastating blow to the Indian Navy's high spirits generated by the earlier exaggerated success stories of missile attacks on Karachi. Not only did the Indian Navy call off a planned missile attack on Karachi due on the 10th of Dec, but no further attacks were conducted for the remaining duration of the war.<br />
<br />
The action of Hangor and the ensuing hunt shall remain an unrivalled event recorded in the annals of naval history. The story shall also serve to remind the future Indian naval generations of the hollowness of the then large Indian Navy anti-submarine force. Here, it is also worth mentioning that despite having preponderance and a huge fleet of Soviet submarines, I.N could neither effectively deploy nor achieve a single strike against the Pakistan Navy through these offensive platforms. To this day, however, unpersuasive attempts continue to be made by the Indians in justifying the blemished role of their submarine fleet in 1971.<br />
<br />
The story of PN submarine Ghazi, though tragic, is no less death defying. It is an epic account of guts written in blood by the crew members. In 1971, PNS Ghazi was the Pakistan Navy's only submarine which had the reach to undertake operations on India's Eastern sea board in the Bay of Bengal. Dispatch of PNS Ghazi (commanded by Commander Zafar Mahmood, Shaheed) was not part of the original plan. The submarine was sent under intense pressure from the Pakistan Army's Eastern command which desired some action by PN to thin out Indian pressure on land. Oddly, this was much against the long stated belief of the Pakistan Army that "defence of East lies in the West" to which PN had previously suffered with at least one naval chief stepping down after Field Marshal Ayub refused his request for maintaining a strong navy to defend both wings.<br />
<br />
In any case, the long and arduous journey of nearly 2,250miles along the enemy's coast, the overwhelming task to lay the newly-acquired mines (launched from submarine torpedo tubes) and the singular effort to track down Indian Carrier against the imposing strength of Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet were just not enough to deter the command and crew of PNS Ghazi in undertaking a mission which by all accounts they knew was only one-way journey.<br />
<br />
Fearing PNS Ghazi, the Indian Navy moved its carrier force (INS Vikrant) further eastward to Andaman Island; much away from the scene of action. For Vice-Admiral N. Krishnan, Flag officer Commanding Indian Navy Eastern Command, PNS Ghazi was no less than a nightmare. In his account, the Indian flag officer acknowledges that each morning he prayed for divine help and protection from Kali Devi (PNS Ghazi). His prayers were indeed answered; Ghazi sank on the night of 3rd-4th Dec after an explosion occurred onboard while the submarine operated off Visakhapatnam. Since all 82 crew members embraced Shahadat it is unlikely that the mystery surrounding circumstances in which Ghazi met her end will ever be unveiled. Still, the Indian claims of sinking Ghazi are not only false but utterly absurd, to say the least.<br />
<br />
It requires no extraordinary interpolation that had PNS Ghazi survived, the possibility of Indian carrier operating in the Bay of Bengal let alone deploy its fighters to augment IAF efforts (as it did following confirmation of sinking of PNS Ghazi) or the symbolic nay bogus naval landing by the Indian Navy carried out on the shores of erstwhile East Pakistan towards the closing stages of the war would have remained only a pipedream. Alas! Things were not in our favour in 1971.<br />
<br />
Though Ghazi's heroic effort could not prevent the war finale, it shall remain an icon of unparalleled gallantry and a shinning beacon of sacrifice in the defence of its motherland. Sadly, while the Hangor crew was aptly rewarded for the daring deed, the valiant effort of PNS Ghazi remains unsung to this day. An award even 35 years later may not be too late but rather serve as a fitting epitaph for the resting souls in the Bay of Bengal.